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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
Peer effect refers to a tendency to behave in a similar way as others, rewarding 
kindness or punishing unfair behaviour of peers. In this paper, impact of the 
self-enforcing peer pressure on two common contractual a訂angemen俗， revenue
sharing and direct supervision, is studied. Efforts are assumed to be observable but 
not completely enforceable in both cases. The results show that when the agents are 
heterogeneous in terms oftheir cost, high-powered incentives would be given to the 
low-cost type in both types of compensation scheme if first best could not be achieved. 
Besides, peer effect favours direct supervision if worker heterogeneity is not too 
strong. These results indicate that the degree of peer pressure may affect the 
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1 Introduction 
As Aristotle stated that, "man is by nature a social animal." Most of us have 
to live with other members of the society, not only because we are too weak 
to be economically independent, but also because we desire to live with other 
people. The interactions between members within the society are affected by 
two main forces: organization structure and the psychological feeling about 
our peers. Peer pressure is one of the factors that highly relate to our daily 
life and economic activities. Most of us have to work with our colleagues 
every day, under different structures of organization. Organizational forms 
are studied by many economists, but what would be the consequence if vve 
apply the concept of peer pressure to those theories? Could peer pressure 
explain the choice of organizational forms, or the choice of contracts, observed 
in our daily life? 
In this paper, impact of the self-enforcing peer pressure on two common 
contractual arrangements, revenue sharing and direct supervision, is studied. 
Although the effect of peer pressure on different contracts are explored in 
previous literature, limited researches relate to the choice between contracts. 
However , the results here show that peer effect favor direct supervision if 
t he worker heterogeneity is not too strong, which implies the degree of peer 
pressure may affect the principal's choice of contract. The paper is organized 
as follow. We have a short literature review in next section. The model is 
presented in section 3. In section 4, first best situation is examined. Then the 
cases of revenue sharing and direct supervision are studied in section 5 and 6 
respectively. Finally, the choice between contracts is discussed in section 7. 
2 Literature Reviews 
2.1 Sources of peer effect 
Peer effect is referred to the externality and interaction between men1bers of 
a group. For those definitions of peer effect that related to economics, there 
are three typical forms mentioned in previous literatures. 
A. Social norms and peer pressure 
Firstly, we tend to behave in a similar way as others. For exan1ple, style 
of dressing varies with age, gender and social status. Old people have the 
habit of dressing in dark or cold colour. Taste change explains part of the 
phenomenon. Besides, if they are asked why they do not choose colourful 
clothes, rnany of them would simply say that they should not do so. They are 
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afraid of being strange. Another example is the dress code in office. Why ties 
and shirts? There is no objective reason. These standards that people follo\v 
according to their characteristics are known as social norms. According to 
theories in psychology, human beings attempt to gain acceptance from one 
particular group of poop e, or identify themselves as a member of the group, 
by following the social norms. The expected rejection from the surrounding 
after violating the norms forms peer pressure. 
The effectiveness of peer pressure does not only depend on the group size, 
but also some qualitative factors such as personalities of the participants and 
the relationship between the peers. In particular, it is believed that young 
people could be easily influenced by their peers. For juvenile crimes, usually 
a group of two to three is sufficient to induce youngster to take action. 
In Carrell, Malmstrom and West (2008), the peer effect on academic 
cheating is studied. To measure the effect of peer's cheating behaviour em-
pirically, there are two main difficulties. First of all, since it is believed that 
we were influenced by our peer, and peer's behaviours were also affected by 
us, so there is a problem of endogeneity. Besides, when we observe high cor-
relations between behaviour of members of a specific group, it might reflect a 
similar background environment that influences all members equally, rather 
than peer pressure. For these reasons, a fixed effect panel data model is used 
in their paper. Data was collected by mail surveys to alumni of US Mili-
tary Academy, US Naval Academy and US Air Force Academy, whose year 
of graduation are in between 1959 and 2002. Year of graduation is divided 
into 11 four-year periods, in order to reduce the incentive of misreporting. 
Respondents were asked about their frequency of cheating in high school and 
college. Then the following equation is estimated by using two-stage least 
squares. 
C ollegeC heatayi 
+ a30Mayi + <fJa + "!y + W + Wayi 
C ollegeC heatayi is the dummy variable indicating whether respondent 
i, who graduated from academy a in period y, cheated in college. Dummy 
variable H SCheatayi. equals to one for high school cheater. It is used as 
an instrument capturing the characteristics of the respondent. 0 Mayi is the 
order of merit in which the respondents graduated. C ollegeC heatay-i is 
the proportion of peers of respondent i who are college cheaters, excluding 
respondent i himself. 
1 
CollegeCheatay- i = ~CollegeCheatayj 
n - 1 L..,. 
ay j i=i 
2 
Their results are summarized as follow. 
Table 1. Exogenous Peer Effect in Academic Cheating 
[From Carrell, Malmstrom and West (2008)] 
Dependent Variable: C ollegeC heatayi 
HSCheatayi 
C ollegeC heatay- i 
Academy X dummy 



















The positive and significant estimated coefficient for C ollegeC heatay- i 
implies that cheating behaviours could be spread within the group. Accord-
ing to the estimates, one additional college cheater would induce another 
0.61 to 0. 75 new cheaters. These new cheaters are expected to further induce 
some other new cheating behaviour. If we allow the process to continue, it 
will converge to the equilibrium that about three cheaters are induced. 
B. Adaptation of values 
Secondly, our values may be influenced by the actions of the people in 
surrounding. This means, our observations affect our judgment on whether 
an action is right or wrong. In Hong Kong, many people cross the road 
without reference to traffic lights. One interesting observation is that people 
tend to obey the rules if most of the pedestrians do so, but violate the 
rules if someone violates. In this case, the pedestrians are just strangers 
to each other and unlikely to receive any punishment as mentioned by the 
social norms theory. It seems that, most of us would feel less guilty about 
a wrongdoing if our peers are participating in that activity. Following this 
logic, we could understand why hard working students motivate each other 
by forming a study group, but lazy students usually shirk together. If we 
know that our partners are spending lots of time in revision, we have more 
motivation to study. If we find that our classmates are playing video games, 
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weak people are often influenced by their peers and have no energy to work 
hard. 
There is an idiom that leopard could not change its spots. We often think 
that our characters, values and judgments are quite unalterable. However, is 
it really the case? In Asch (1952), an experiment on distortion of judgments 
is described. A group of 7 to 9 college students participated in each session of 
the experiment, and there were 12 rounds for each session. Tvvo cards were 
sho\vn to them in each round of experiment. A straight line was dra\vn on 
one of the two cards (standard line) , while three straight lines with different 
length were drawn on the other card (comparison lines). The students were 
asked to compare the length of the lines, and decide which one of the three 
comparison lines is the same as the standard line. Then they had to announce 
their judgments respectively. Actually, only one of the students in the group 
\Vas the tested subject, while the rest were cooperating with the experimenter. 
The cooperating group was instructed to give wrong but consistent answers to 
7 of the 12 questions together. Moreover, control experiments were conducted 
by asking the students to write down their judgments privately. The result 
shows that accuracy of judgments fail significantly under group pressure. 
This suggests that our judgments are vulnerable to peer pressure, even on 
simple and objective matters. 
Table 2. Majority responses to standard and comparison lines 
on successive trials [From Asch (1952)] 
TI·ials Length of standard Length of comparison lines (inches) 
line (inches) 1 2 3 
1* 7.5 5 5.75 7.5 
2* 5 6.5 7 5 
3 8 8 7 6 
4 3.5 3.75 5 3.5 
5* 9 7 9 11 
6 6.5 6.5 5.25 7.5 
7 5.5 4.5 5.5 4 
8* 1.75 2.75 3.25 1.75 
g 2.5 4 2.5 3.375 
10 8.5 8.5 10.25 11 
11* 1 3 1 2.25 
12 4.5 4.5 3.5 5.5 
Underlined figures are referred to the incorrect majority responses 
* The majority responded correctly in these trials 
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Table 3. Distribution of errors in Critical and control groups 
[From Asch (1952)] 
Number of errors Control Group Critical Group 
0 14 6 
1 9 7 
2 2 6 
3 0 4 
4 0 4 
5 0 1 
6 0 1 
7 0 2 
N 25 31 
Remark: 
Wilcoxon rank-surn test: z=-3.90, p-value=O.OO 
H 1 : There were less errors in control groups 
r-=---contt:~-Gr~;----1 
' 
l -Cl·itfcaf Group 1 
t ___ ._________ . -----·-- - -- --------·.} 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of Errors 
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Finally, we find that humans are usually generous in response to kindness 
behaviour of their peers, but do not cooperate with those vvho are unco-
operative. In John Dryden's words, love is love's reward. This behaviour 
is also known as reciprocity in the literatures. One might argue that hu-
man are taught to reward and revenge, so reciprocity could be explained 
by social norms. It is true that education and culture play an important 
role in reciprocal behaviours. However, the interaction between children is 
hardly explained in this way, as children reward and revenge even they are 
not taught to do so. Also, animals such as dogs are also sensitive to our 
attitudes. Trust has to be developed in exchange for long lasting loyalty. For 
these reasons, it is believed that many animals, including humans, reward 
kindness instinctively. 
In Fehr and Gachter (2001), two players principal agent problem is ana-
lyzed. Groups of two players are formed randomly at each period, without 
knowing the identity of their counterparts, so that reputation or long term 
relationship is irrelevant in their experiment. In each group, one of the play-
ers is assigned as the principal, while his partner is asked to play the role of 
agent. Two different arrangements are tested, named as trust treatment and 
incentive treatment. 
For the trust treatment, each principal offers a fixed wage w to his agent, 
with a target level of effort e. Then the agents could accept or reject the 
contract based on their ovvn judgment. If the agent accepts the contract, he 
would be asked to choose an effort level e, which could be more or less than 
the announced target. Mter the effort e is realized, the principal earns a 













if the contract is accepted 
if the contract is rejected 
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if the contract is rejected 
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Since the cost of effort is increasing, payoff for agents would be reduced 
if they exert more effort. As fixed wage contracts are used in this case, and 
no punishment would be implemented when the agents shirk, there is no 
monetary incentive to motivate production. If the agents are selfish, they 
would provide an effort level as low as possible in order to maximize their 
payoff u. In this case, e* = 0.1. 
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For the incentive treatment, beside the fixed wages wand targets e, each 
principal also chooses a fine f' where f < 13. If e < e, a fine f would be 
i1nposed on that agent and received by the principal at a probability of ~. 
The expected payoffs 1r and u are shown as below. 
7r = { 
100e- w 
~OOe- w + ~~ 
{ 
w- c(e) 
u = ~- c(e)- V 
if the contract is accepted and e < e 
if the contract is accepted and e > e 
if the contract is rejected 
if the contract is accepted and e < e 
if the contract is accepted and e > e 
if the contract is rejected 
For selfish agents, they choose e only if the expected disutility from the 
punishment is higher than the cost of exerting e, i.e. ~ f > c(e). Otherwise, 
they shirk and choose e* = 0.1. 
However, their experimental results deviate from those implied by the 
selfishness assumption. Although most of the agents exert less effort than 
the first best case ( eF B = 1), a large portion of them are willing to choose 
e > 0.1. 69% of the agents do not shirk completely in the trust treatment. 
In the case of incentive treatment, about 30% of agents choose e > 0.1 when 
~ f < c(e). These results suggest that the participants are not con1pletely 
self-interested. 
Besides, their experimental evidence shows a positive relation between 
the effort level e chosen by agents in trust treatment and their wage w. This 
result matches with those predicted by the efficiency wage theories. Since 
new groups of two are formed at the end of each period, choosing a small 
e in this period would not diminish his future offers, so a high wage in this 
setting does not imply a high opportunity cost of shirking. Probably, there 
are some other psychological factors influencing our decision. One of the 
possible explanation is that humans reward kindness naturally. ~lhen the 
agents are given a positive rent, they would shirk less in response to the 
amicability. 
For empirical researches, however, it is hard to distinguish one type of 
peer effect from another. This is because the real underlying psychological 
forces could not be revealed easily in most of the cases. Using the case of 
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academic cheating mentioned above as an example, there could be different 
interpretations for the observed peer effect. Firstly, a social norm of cheating 
may be formed \vithin the college when there are enough students cheating 
in examinations. Besides, cheating may become more acceptable among the 
students if they find that some of their classmates cheated. Finally, since 
academic performances are usually measured by our rank in the class and 
school, peer's dishonest behaviour rnay be viewed as hostile action. Thus 
retaliation may be the driving force of the induced cheating. Of course, the 
observed peer effect could be a result of all three forces. 
2.2 Peer pressure and contracts 
Given the existence of peer effect within teams, then, what would be the 
interactions between this effect and the incentive schemes? This question is 
studied in some previous literatures, for examples, Kandel and Lazear (1992), 
Daido (2004), Hehenkarnpy and Kaarb0e (2004), Fischer and Huddart (2008) 
and Huck, Kiibler and Weibull (2006). 
A. Peer pressure and partnership: Kandel and Lazear (1992) 
Peer pressure within team work is studied in Kandel and Lazear (1992). 
In their model, the are n identical agents working in a team. For agent i, 
an unenforceable effort ei. is exerted by bearing a cost c( ei), \V here c' > 0 
and c" > 0. The total output is f(e) = f(e1 , ... ,en), where f' > 0 and 
f" < 0, and each agent can get an equal share of it. A cost of peer pressure 
P( e1, ... ,en) is introduced, which depends on the effort of all participants. It 
is assumed that ~~ < 0, so that there is a psychological force motivating 
member in a team to work harder. This kind of setting is sometimes known 
as one-sided peer pressure. When the peer effect is one-sided, there would 
be a psychological cost if the effort level is below certain standard, but not 
in the case that too much effort is exerted. 
Thus the maximization problem for agent i becomes: 
Then we can derive the first order condition: 
1 8f(e) 8P 
---c'-- = 0 
n aei aei 
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Let's assume e to be the solution when there is peer effect, while e be 
that without peer effect. By the first order condition, we have 
~ 8f(e) _ c'(ei ) _ 8P = ~ 8f(e) _ c'(ei) 
n aei 8ei n 8ei 




Therefore, the existence of peer effect raise the production level. 
Since in theory there should be a free-riding problem for partnership, it is 
hard to explain why a small share of profit is enough to motivate participants 
in large partnership. Given the above results, Kandel and Lazear argued that 
peer pressure between partners may help to solve the free- riding problem. 
B. Peer pressure and risk aversion: Daido (2004} 
Based on the foundation of Kandel and Lazear (1992), team production 
with heterogeneous agents were studied in papers such as Daido (2004) and 
Hehenkampy and Kaarb0e (2004). Different from Kandel and Lazear (1992), 
peer pressure is assumed to be two-sided in Daido (2004) and Hehenkampy 
and Kaarb0e (2004). \\Then it is two-sided, there would be a disutility when 
deviation takes place, no matter it is above or below the average standard. 
This means all members have an incentive to act in a similar way. Under this 
setting, pressure experienced by one particular member could be strengthen 
or relieved when the average standard increases, depending on his relative 
performance. For the agents who are exerting more effort than the average, 
pressure experienced by them would be relieved if their partners work harder, 
because they get closer to the average standard of the group. On the contrary, 
an increase in average effort level would strengthen the pressure experienced 
by the unproductive agents in the t eam. For this reason, the productive 
effect of peer effect claimed by Kandel and Lazear may no longer exist. 
In Daido (2004), the author investigated the linear revenue sharing con-
tract with two agents having different abilities in production and attitudes 
towards risk. For agent i, an unenforceable effort ei is exerted with a cost ~i e7. 
The team output is f(e) +c, where c is a random variable and f(e) = e1 +e2. 
Similar to Kandel and Lazear (1992), there is a cost of peer pressure Pi for 
agent i, where Pi = ~i (ei - ei) 2 fori # j. Thus an increase in effort does 
not always reduce the peer pressure. ai and f3i are chosen by the principal 
so that agent i would get W i = ai + f3i [f( e) + c] after the production process. 
There is no restriction on (3i , so the commission rate could be above 100%. 
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Utility for agent i is ui = exp[-r(wi- ~et- ii (ei - ej)2)]. Both agents would 
accept the contract if it generates a non-negative certainty equivalence C Ei· 
ki 2 pi ( ) 2 1 2 2 CEi ~ ai + (3if(e )- 2 ei- 2 ei- ei - 2ra f3i 
Then agent i maximizes his certainty equivalence as below. 
ki 2 Pi ( )2 1 2(32 maxCE·=a·+/3-(e·+e·)- - e. -- e·-e· --ra · 
ei ~ ~ 't ~ 1 2 't 2 ~ 1 2 ~ 
Since the objective function is concave, we can find out the optimal ef-
fort levels by solving the first order conditions (3i - kiei - Pi( ei - ej) = 0. 
Based on this expectation, the principal maximize his profit subject to the 
participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints. 
st CEi > 0 
(3 . - k·e . - p-(e·- e·) = 0 
't 't 't 't 't J 
Daido exhibited that the optimal steepness of the incentive scheme, i.e. 
f3:, depends on their sensitivity to peer effect (pJ, their cost functions (ki) 
and also the degrees of risk aversion (r ). In particular, if both agents are 
risk neutral, the agent with less efficient technology (larger ki) receives high-
powered incentive (larger f3:). 
C. Between-group and within-group peer pressure: Hehenka·mpy and Kaar-
bRJe (2004) 
Furthermore, peer pressure between two groups and that within groups 
are studied in Hehenkampy and Kaarb0e (2004). In their model, k agents 
belong to group A and n- k agents belong to group B, i.e. A. = {1, ... , k} 
and B = {k + 1, ... , n }. ei is the effort level chosen by agent i, which is not 
vertificable. c( ei) is the cost of effort while P( ei -e- i ) is that of peer pressure. 
e_i is a weighted average of effort exerted by the agents, excluding that of 
agent i. Both between-group peer pressure and within-group peer pressure 
exist, while the sensitivities to these two type of peer pressure are assumed 
to be different. 
for ViE A 
e_i = 
for ViE B 
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P( ei - e_i) reaches its minimum if ei - e_i = 0, so the peer effect studied 
in Hehenkampy and Kaarb0e (2004) is two-sided in nature. At the end, an 
output f(e) = fA I:ei + !B L ei is realized, where fA> !B > 0. ai + f3if(e) 
j EA j EB 
is the compensation received by agent i. Sinlilar to Daido (2004), there is no 
restriction on the commission rates. For this reason, the first best production 
level could be achieved. For each agent, based on the given incentives, effort 
level is chosen to maximize his payoff. 
Since the outside option for these agents is assumed to give no value, the 
principal maximizes his profit by maximizing the joint welfare. 
Their result suggests that the optimal commission rate chosen by the 
principal may not be 100% even it is feasible, different from the case without 
peer pressure. In order to reduce the counter-productive effect of peer pres-
sure between groups, different incentive schemes are offered to the t\vo types 
of agent. If the between-group peer pressure is sufficiently strong, i.e. () is 
large enough, unproductive agents would be given a commission rate higher 
than 100%, but productive agents would receive a rate less than 100%. Then 
the between-group variation in effort levels would be moderated, and hence 
the joint welfare would be improved. 
D. M uti-task situation: Fischer and Huddart (2008) 
Moreover, in Fischer and Huddart (2008), the authors study the case 
that both desirable action and undesirable action could be taken by the 
agents simultaneously, while the principal could not distinguish between the 
two. For example, the principal can only observe how long his employees 
stay in office, but not know what they do during the office hours. The 
employees may simply chat in the office and claim for overtime. In their 
model, ei stands for the desirable action taken by agent i while hi stands 
for the undesirable action. This undesirable action imposes a cost vihi to 
the principal. The principal receives a stochastic signal which has a mean of 
R( ei + hi). A contract is offered to agent i so that the expected value of his 
wage is ai + biR(ei +hi)· g(ei- NeJ and g(hi + NhJ are the costs of taking 
desirable action and that of undesirable respectively. g' > 0 and g" > 0. N ei 
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is the norm for desirable action and N ~ is that for undesirable action. Both 
Nei and Nhi are the weighted average of the respective personal norm (Ei 
and Hi) and social norm (Se and Sh)· Social norms are assumed to be the 
average level of that particular action. 
where 
where JI hidi sh = - r d· 
JJ 1, 
Then each agent maximizes his expected utility ui by choosing suitable 
ei and hi. The reservation level for all agents are assumed to be u. 
The cost minimization problem becon1es: 
st. Ui > U 
biR'- g'(ei- NeJ 0 
biR'- g'(hi + NhJ 0 
Different from the papers mentioned before, instead of having a separated 
term for the peer effect, there is only a total cost g( ·) in their model. \~le can 
not easily classify it as one-sided or two-sided. However, total cost faced by 
the team as a whole would reduce if variation in effort level decreases, since 
the cost function is assumed to be convex. Besides, cost increases \Vhen the 
agent takes more action, even the gap between norm and action has narrowed 
do\VTI. 
When there is desirable action only, their result suggests that social nonn 
multiplies the effect on desirable action when there is a change in exogenous 
factors, such as incentive parameters a and b, personal norm E i and the sen-
sitivity to social norm "'i · For exan1ple, when the contract beco1nes steeper, 
the direct effect is an increase in ei , and consequently results in a higher 
social norm and further promotes the desirable action. 
The authors also find out the situation that breaking a team into two 
would be beneficial, if the agents could take both desirable and undesirable 
actions. Assuming that two different levels of desirable action e and ~ are 
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demanded bn agents are asked to provide e while (1 - b)n agents are asked 
to provide ~- IT all agents are working in the same place, only one social 
norm \vill form among the agents for each action. Then the cost per agent 
would be C1 . If the two teams are working separately, each team will have 
one independent norm for each action, and the respective cost per agent is 
C2 . By comparing C1 with C2 , they found that the sensitivities to social 
norms ( "'i and 1;i) could affect the decision on whether the two teams should 
be rnerged or not. 
E. Comparison between contracts: Huck, Kiibler and Weibull {2006) 
Besides, the interaction between peer pressure and incentive schemes is 
also investigated in Ruck, Ktibler and Weibull (2006). Three types of con-
tract, including piece rate, team pay and relative-performance pay, are con1-
pared. In their model, there are n agents participate in a production process. 
Agent i exerts an effort ei . Output of this production equals to f( e) = L:ei. 
'i 
Verifiability of effort is assumed to be different in the three situations: a) 
Individual efforts are verifiable when piece rate is used; b) individual efforts 
are not observable but team output is verifiable when team pay is imple-
mented; and c) individual efforts are observable with noise in the case of 
relative-performance pay. 
For agent i, his utility ui( e) consists of t\vo parts, which are his material 
payoff vi( e) and the peer pressure part Pi. 
ui(e) = vi( e) + pi (L[vj(ei, e_i) - Vj(e)], vi(ei, e_i)- vi(e)) 
j :pi 
1 2 
vi( e) = wi(e)- 2ei 
wi (e) is the compensation for agent i, while his corresponding cost is ~et. 
e here stands for the social ideal. Based on the assmnptions Pf1 > 0, agents 
gain utility if their deviation from the social ideal improves the material 
payoffs of their counterparts, but disutility if this deviation hurts his partners. 
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According to the authors, this social ideal should be the effort level that 
maximizes the total material payoff of all agents under a specified contract. 
However, this definition of social norms seems to be quite different from 
that used in previous literatures. As mentioned before, social norm theories 
claim that people tend to mimic each other if they belong to the same group. 
However, we do not assume that joint welfare would be maximized if the 
members follo\v these social norms. On the contrary, researches in social 
norms are often related to behaviours that hurt the members actually. For 
examples, juvenile delinquency, smoking and drug addition are some of the 
major topics related to peer pressure and social norms, but it is not obvious 
that the image mimicked by those people are optimal for them. 
e = argmax L:=vi(e) 
e 
l 
If piece rates are applied, Wi = biei. Than the optimization problem for 
the principal becomes: 
mF 2;:(1- bi)e~ 
t 
st. e~ = arg max ui( e) 
ei 
By comparing the result with that without Pi, \Ve can see that peer effect 
is irrelevant when piece rates are implemented. The reason behind is that 
there is no conflict of interests between each individual and the group as a 
whole. 
In the case of team pay, wi = ~f( e). This means all the agents obtain an 
equal share of the output. The principal maximizes the residual he receives, 
within the incentive compatibility constraints. 
m;x (1 -b) 2;:e~ 
1, 
st. e~ = argmax ui( e) 
e,~ 
Again, the authors make a comparison between the situation with peer 
effect and that without. Their result shows that peer effect in this setting 
could enhance efficiency. The intuition is that social norm in this model 
\Veaken the incentive of each agent to hurt his partner. This norm could 
be viewed as an informal mechanism to facilitate collusion. For team pay 
contract, the agents tend to free-ride their partners and exert too little effort, 
so the efficiency of team pay contracts could be improved by collusion. 
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For the relative performance pay all agents get nothing if the total pro-
duction is less than the benchmark level m. On the contrary, if f (e ) > m, a 
prize b would be shared among the agents according to their relative contri-
bution. 
if LJ=l e1 >m 
if LJ=l e1 <m 
The principal 1naxinuzes his profit as below. 
max Le~- b 
b,m . 
1, 
st. e~ = arg max ui (e ) 
ei 
The social ideal in this case is to reach the benchmark but no further , i.e. 
ei = m. However, the agents compete over the prize and this competition 
n 
raises production. For this reason, the existence of peer effect spoils efficiency 
of relative performance pay contracts, since collusion is assisted by the social 
norm in this model. 
Based on the above reviews, we can see that theoretical predictions on 
econonilc behaviours largely depend on the definition and interpretation of 
peer effect. In this paper, I am going to use a definition that matches the 
descriptions on peer effect in the former part of literature reviews. Then the 
effect of peer pressure on two common contractual arrangements, revenue 
sharing and direct supervision, is studied. 
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3 Model 
To keep matters simple, the discussion here would follow a simple model of 
team production consisting of one principal, and two agents, agent A and 
agent B . All of them are assumed to be risk neutral. The principal has the 
right to an investment project, but he does not participate in the production 
process himself. In order to get a revenue F (e) = eA + e B, the agents have 
to exert some effort and ei. denotes the effort level of agent i, ei E [0, oo) . 
Efforts are assumed to be observable but not completely enforceable. 
Since the principal does not participate in the production himself, he is ex-
pected to have less information about the behaviours of his employees than 
the employees themselves. Also, as the employees work together closely in 
team production, it is reasonable to assume that they know exactly what 
their partners did. For this reason, agents could take action in response 
to those taken by their partners, but the principal could not regulate their 
actions directly through a formal contract. To verify the true effort level 
ei on the court, the principal has to invest kti in monitoring technology ex 
ante, where t i is the production target he proposes. This means the total 
monitoring cost increases if the proposed target is higher, as the principal 
has to spend more time and resources to check the work. Qi = q(ti, ei ) is the 
probability that there is enough evidence to prove the shirking behaviour of 
agent i, and it is observable by all three players. It is expected that ~~: > 0 
and ~~: < 0, which means the slight shirking behaviour could not be detected 
easily. 
Following the setting of Daido ( 2004), cost function of agent i is assumed 
to be ~c/Jief, and cfJB > cp A . Types of the agents are common knowledge. 
Besides, there is also a cost of peer pressure ~ = ~p(ei - e1)2 for agent i, 
where i #- j. Thus p could be interpreted as the sensitivity to peer pressure. 
There would be a strong motivation to mimic his partner when p is high. 
Moreover, p < cpi is assu1ned, which implies the peer pressure has no stronger 
effect on utility than the cost of production. For simplicity, we assume there 
is no peer pressure between the principal and the agents. 
This peer pressure function has several important implications. Firstly, 
a positive peer pressure would be experienced by the agent if his effort is 
less than that exerted by his peer. Lazy people would be motivated if they 
observe that their partners are working hard. Secondly, peer pressure is also 
experienced by the agent who is providing a higher level of effort. Employees 
would be more likely to be lazy if their peers are lazy. This means the 
peer pressure here is assumed to be two-sided. Thirdly, member in a team 
would provide a positive effort if his counterparts do so, even there is no 
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monetary incentives given to him. This matches with the results of empirical 
experiments such as Fehr and Gachter (2001). 
Another point have to be mentioned is that, as we can see, the agents 
can ahvays "punish" their partners through peer pressure or social norm 
after observations, while the principal can only do so when they have enough 
evidence. Even the agents do not sue their shirking colleagues, but they 
could always hate or be apathetic to the violator. This is one of the major 
differences between rule of law and that of ethic and custom. People usually 
demand stronger evidence in the case of formal punishment. However, it 
does not mean that the effect of social norms has to be small or insignificant 
relative to formal contract. It depends on the values and characteristics of the 
members, and also their demand on social life. Sometimes people care about 
vvhat their fellows thought and said rather than the material consequences. 
For this production project, the principal can either share the revenue 
with the agents, or give them a fixed wage with supervision. If revenue 
sharing contract is chosen, agent i \vould receive ai + f3iF at the end of 
production. If wage contract is chosen, the principle would announce his 
target effort level ex ante. If he has sufficient evidences to prove that one of 
the agents does not exert enough effort, he is allowed to fire that employee 
without any compensation and also punishment. Otherwise, he pays Wi to 
each agent respectively. Hard working agent always gets Wi, while shirking 
agent may be fired at a probability of Qi. 
If the agents accept the offer, they would decide their effort level simul-
taneously in order to maximize their individual payoff. Their alternative 
income is assumed to be zero. This means the contract would be accepted 
only if the expected payoff is non-negative. 
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4 First Best Situation 
In the case of first best, eA and eB are enforceable, so these two effort levels 
are chosen to maximize the joint profit. 
First order conditions are: 
1- qyAeA- 2p(eA- eB) 






Let the superscript F B denotes optimal solution if first best is achieved. 
By rearranging terms, we get the optimal level of efforts e~B and e~B. 
qyB + 4p 
4> A4>B + 24> AP + 24>BP 
qyA + 4p 
(3) 
(4) 
Then we have e~B = et;8 if 4>B = <P A' and e~B > et;B if 4>B > <P A. This 
means the cost-efficient agent exerts no less effort than his peer, and both 
agents would experience the peer pressure if they are heterogeneous in their 
cost. 
defB 
-( 4>j + 4p)(4>j + 2p) t ( )2 < 0 (5) d<f;i 4>i4>i + 24JiP + 2qyip 
def'B 
-2p(<f;j + 4p) J i /= j (6) 
d<f;i ( )2 < 0 <Pi4>i + 2</;iP + 2qyip 
From inequality (5), we can see that an reduction in cost of one agent 
would promote his production. Besides, inequality ( 6) implies a spill over 
effect that both agents would increase t heir production if the cost of their 
partner is reduced, even there is no t echnological transfer between the agents. 
One one hand, if the cost of agent A (efficient type) is reduced, there would 
be a direct promotive effect on e~ B. Then agent B is induced to exert n1ore 
effort by the strengthened peer pressure. On the other hand, if there is an 
improvement in technology of the less efficient employee agent B, he would 
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then exert more effort due to the lower cost. Then the peer pressure would 
be abated. Thus agent A would be willing to increase his effort level. 
Moreover, we have: 
2<Pn(<PA- <Pn) < 0 (</JA</JB + 2</JAP + 2</JnP) 2 -
2</JA(</JB-</JA) >0 
(</JA</JB + 2</JAP + 2</JBP) 2 -
This means in the case of heterogeneous agents, e~B decreases with p but 
e~B rises. The effort levels converge in order to lessen the disutility from 
peer pressure. Since <PB > <P A' change in e~B would be larger in magnitude, 
so the total effort e~B + e~B fails. 
!!_(IIFB + UFB + UFB) = -(eFB _ eFB)2 < 0 dp A B A B - (7) 
There would be a reduction in the joint profit when the agents are more 
sensitive to peer pressure, unless they are identical in terms of production 
cost. This is because when the agents are less willing to be an outlier, compe-
tent agent has to reduce his effort in order to relieve the peer pressure. Then 
production distortion arise and the joint profit is worsened. This result sug-
gests that peer effect is relevant if the agents are heterogeneous, even when 
effort is verifiable. This implies that results in Huck, Kiibler and Weibull 
(2006) are highly related to their assumption of identical agents. 
This result has two implications. Firstly, when effort is enforceable and 
agents are heterogeneous in efficiency, it would be better if there is less inter-
action between the agents, so that the agents become less sensitive to peer 
pressure. This could be done by separating the agents, or making the efforts 
less observable between the agents. Secondly, when effort is enforceable and 
there are two types of agents with different ability, the optimal strategy is 
to form two separated teams so that each of them consists of members with 
similar ability, i.e. clustering in terms of cost-efficiency. In this way, peer 
pressure would be eliminated at equilibrium. Then the parties could share a 
joint profit as if there is no peer effect , which is higher than that generated 
after a merger. 
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5 Revenue Sharing Contract under peer pres-
sure 
When the revenue is shared betwren the players, agent i receives ai + j3 i ( ei + 
ej) at the end of the project. Since the two agents maximize their own payoff 
simultaneously given ai and j3i, their problems become: 
1 2 1 2 
max U· = a · + {3-(e· + e ·) - _ _.~,._e. - -p(e· - e ·) 
ei t t t t J 2 'Yt t 2 t 1 (OP2) 
As cpi > 0 and p > 0, the solution (eA, eB) satisfying the following equa-
tions, which are the F.O.C. of their optimization problems, would solve the 
above optimization problems. Besides, based on the phase diagram in figure 




(3 A - <f> A eA - p( eA - e B) 






Figure 2. Best response of the agents when revenue is shared among the 
players 
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Anticipating this result, the principal chooses ai and f3i in the first period 
to maximized his own profit. Obviously, the optimal strategy depends on 
the constraints on ai and f3i· Some ai and f3i may not be feasible in certain 
circumstances. In the following subsections, three situations are discussed. 
5.1 No constraints on the fixed payments and commis-
sion rates 
In this case, the principal could freely choose any effort levels indirectly by 
choosing ai and f3 i. Then the optimal strategy is a set of contract such that 
the tv..ro agents are \villing to exert first best effort, which are chosen if effort is 
enforceable. Thus we can solve the optimal contract by substituting equation 





Equations (10) and (11) are the participation constraints of the two 
agents. Since the agents would not accept a contract that give them nega-
tive utility, the principal would offer a contract that gives them zero utility 
in order to maximize his profit. Equations (12) and (13) are the incentive 
compatibility constraints of the two agents, which are deduced from equation 
(8) and (9). 
By equation (8) and (9), we have: 
(cpj + p){Ji + p{Jj 
ei = --~--------~-
c/JA1B + P1A + pc/JB 
This i1nplies the agent would exert more effort if a contract with higher 
commission rate is offered. 
3pcfJA + P1B + 1Ac/JB < 1 
2pcp A+ 2p</JB + c/J AcpB 
P<PA + 3pcpB + 1A1B > 1 




Equation (15) implies that the commission rate for inefficient agent have 
to be larger than 100% in order to achieve the first best level of effort. Be-
sides, the inefficient agent should receive a higher commission rate than his 
partner. A commission rate higher than 100% is needed because the agents 
are maximizing their own payoff and do not care about the peer pressure 
they impose on their partners, so we have to correct the distortion by using a 
strong incentive. Besides, according to equation (14) and (15), f3 A = f3 B = 1 
if c/YB = c/YA, and f3B > f3A if cfs > cfA· This means the inefficient agent 
would receive a higher f3 if there is no constraints on the fixed payments and 
commission rates. Moreover, this result matches with Daido (2004), which 
also implies the less efficient agent would receive a higher commission rate if 
they are both risk neutral. 
Proposition 1 When revenue is shared between the parties, first best effort 
could not be achieved unless the commission rate for inefficient agent is higher 
than 100%. If first best effort is achieved, the inefficient agent receives a 
commission rate higher than that of the efficient agent, but he exerts less 
effort than his efficient partner. [By equation (3}, (4), {14} and {15}} 
In comparison, Hehenkampy and Kaarb0ez (2004) suggests that unpro-
ductive agent should receive high-powered incentive. They define productiv-
ity by the impact of effort on revenue, and assume an identical cost function 
for both agents. The difference of two models is explored by applying the 
idea of Hehenkampy and Kaarb0ez (2004) to a simplified model here. Let 
F(e) = VAeA +VB~ be the revenue of a project, where ei is the effort ex-
erted by agent i and vi is the value of this effort. Without loss of generality, 
VA > VB is assumed, which means agent A is more productive. The cost 
function of agent i is ~cfet and the cost of peer pressure is ~ p(~ - ej )2 for 
agent i, where i =1- j. Then, by maximizing the joint profit, we could solve 
the first best effort levels. 
First order conditions are: 
VA- cpeA- 2p(eA- eB) 






By rearranging terms, we get the first best level of efforts e~B and ef;B' 
which are optimal if effort is enforceable. 
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VAcp + 2p(vA +VB) 
</>2 + 4</>p 
vn<P + 2p(vA + vn) 
<1>2 + 4</>p 
(18) 
(19) 
Similar to Hehenkampy and Kaarb0ez (2004), a linear revenue sharing 
contr~ct is used to achieve first best efforts, . Agent i receives a commission 





As shown in figure (3), since <P > 0 and p > 0, there would be an unique 




Figure 3. Best response of the agents when revenue is shared among the 
players (difference in productivity exists) 
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fj = v;(</>2 + 3</>p) + 4>fYVi 
t Vi ( </>2 + 4</>p) 
Since v A > v B, we have (3 B > (3 A. The major discrepancy between t he 
two models is that Hehenkampy and Kaarb0ez (2004) assumed a variation 
in the value of efforts. Quality is not controlled for ei but ei . By defining 
ei = viei, then the optimization problem (OP3) becomes: 
(OP4) 
If we substitute qmi- 2 by <Pi , then it would be the same as optimization 
problem (OP3) except the peer pressuTe term. Without peer pressme, the 
productive type in Hehenkampy and Kaarb0ez (2004) is equivalent to the 
efficient type in this paper. The difference in peer pressure term could be 
interpreted as a discrepancy in the definition of peer pressUTe. For example, 
ei could be the working homs of agent i, but he may work painstakingly 
or recklessly. On the contrary, ei is the efficient effort that measures how 
t he task is done rather than how many hours the agent spent on it. T hen 
peer pressure term p(eA- eB)2 means that disutility comes from difference 
in working hoUTs, while p( eA - eB)2 implies that peer pressme comes from 
difference in achievements. Although the results above suggest that this 
difference in definition does not affect the conclusion, we should bear in mind 
that this difference may affect the result in some other cases as if different 
functions are used. 
5.2 Negative fixed payment is allowed, but the sum of 
commission rates has t o be less than lOO% 
A negative fixed payment a i is similar to the entry fee or franchise fee. 
However, the contract is seemed to be not so practical if (3 A + (3 B > 1 in 
some situations. In most of the cases in the dailylife, if not all, total sharing 
rate does not exceed 100%. Risk aversion of the agents is part of the reasons. 
Besides, the principal has incentive to obstruct the production process if the 
commission rate is above 100%. Revenue itself is not enough to cover the 
variable part of the compensations. Since L a i is highly negative if L (3i > 1, 
he could enjoy a high rent if the revenue is smaller than that expected, at the 
expense of some agents. For example, he may bribe one of the agents and 
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ask him to exert no effort. Then ex post payment would be largely reduced. 
For this reason, a contracts with L f3i > 1 may not be practical in reality. 
This argument is similar to that proposed by Eswaran and Kotwal ( 1984) 
on the 1noral hazard problem of budget-breaking. If the residual received by 
the principal does not increase with the agents' effort levels, self-interested 
principal may bribe some of the agents to enhance his profit. In some sit-
uations, this moral hazard problem may be less crucial. For example, as 
mentioned by Gaynor (1989), if there is competition between principals and 
they care about long-term benefit, the principal may not treat even his payoff 
decreases with the agents' effort levels. 
For this reason, one additional constraint L j3i < 1 is included into the 
model. The optimization problem facing by the principal becomes: 
st. 
maxii = (1- f3A- j3B)(eA + eB)- aA- aB 
cx,j3,e 
1 2 1 2 O:A + j3 A(eA + eB) - 2<f>AeA- 2p(eA- eB) > 0 
1 2 1 2 O:B + j3B(eA + eB)- 2</>BeB- 2p(eB- eA) > 0 
j3A - cpAeA - p(eA- eB) = 0 








Equations (22) and (23) are the participation constraints of the two 
agents, while equations (24) and (25) are the incentive compatibility con-
straints. Equality holds for equations (22) and (23) as the principal has all 
the bargaining power. Besides, the agent, who is exerting less effort, could 
be motivated if he receives a higher commission rate. Then peer pressure 
experienced by both parties would be reduced, so the principal can increase 
his profit by increasing the commission rate for that agent and capturing his 
rent though the fixed part a. If both agents exert the same level of effort, 
the principal could earn more by increasing their commission rates equally. 
For these reasons, 1 - f3 A - f3 B = 0 at the equilibrium. 
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By substituting the participation constraints back into the objective func-
tion, we have 
st. f3A - cj;AeA- p(eA- en) = 0 
f3n - c/JBeB- p(eB- eA) = 0 




Let the superscript RS denotes optimal solution for revenue sharing with 
the constraint L f3 i < 1. As shown in the appendix, e~, e~s, and (3~5 are 
solved and the second order sufficient condition is satisfied. 
eRS A ( c/J A + c/J B) ( c/J A c/J B + 2 pc/J A + 2 pc/J B) 
c/J~ + 2pc/J A+ 2prpB 
( c/J A + c/J B) ( rp A rp B + 2 prp A + 2 pc/J B) 
prp~ + c/J A4J1 + 2pc/J Ac/JB + PrfJ1 
( c/J A+ rpB) ( c/J Ac/JB + 2pc/J A+ 2prpB) 
According to section (9.1), e~s > e~s and !3? > ! > (3~5 if c/Jn > rj;A. 
Proposition 2 If the sum of commission rates has to be less than 100%, 
efficient agent exerts more effort and receives a higher commission rate {high-
powered incentive) than the inefficient one. Both of them experience the peer 
pressure if the agents are heterogeneous. However, the agents exert the same 
level of effort and split the revenue evenly if they are equally competent. [Proof 
is shown in section {9.1}} 
Proposition (1) and (2) suggests that the constraint L f3i < 1 determines 
who receives a higher commission rate, but not \vho exerts more effort. Be-
sides, according to proposition (1), both agents would be under production 
if constraint (26A) is satisfied, since the agents have not enough motivation 
to maximize the joint profit. 
We can see that the equilibrium efforts and commission rates depend on 
the sensitivity to peer pressure, similar to the case of first best situation. 
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deW 2</>A(<f>B -<f>A) { > 0 if </JB > c/JA (28) dP = (</>A rf>B + 2p</J A + 2p</J B )2 = 0 if </JB = </J A 
Equations (27) and (28) mean e? decreases with p but e~s rises in the 
case of heterogeneous agents. The difference between these two optimal effort 
levels is reduced so that the disutility from peer pressure could be mitigated. 
As cj;B > <P A' change in e~ would be larger than that in e~s in magnitude. 
Thus the sum of effort levels e~8 + eW decreases with the sensi ti vi ty to peer 
pressure. 
</J A </J B ( </J A - </J B) { < 0 if </J B > cP A 
( </J A</JB + 2p</J A+ 2p</JB)2 = 0 if </JB = cP A (29) 
Equation (29) implies that the efficient agent would receive a lower com-
mission rate if he is more sensitive to peer pressure. Since L f3i = 1 at 
equilibrium, the commission rates of two agents converge if p increases. This 
is because the principal would like to narrow the gap of production levels in 
order to compensate part of the increased cost of peer pressure. 
Proposition 3 If the agents are more sensitive to peer pressure, then the 
commission rates of two agents converge. Besides, the difference in effort 
levels would also decrease. On the contrary, if the two agents are equally 
competent, change in sensitivity to peer pressure would not affect the optimal 
effort levels and commission rates. [By equation (28} and (29}} 
dfi RS (</>A - rf>B) 2 { < 0 if </J B > </J A ( 30) 
~ = - (</JA</JB + 2p</JA + 2p</JB)2 = 0 if rj>B = rj>A 
As the agents receive no rent in this case, the profit of the principal 
rrRs equals to the joint welfare of the three participants. Equation (30) 
suggests that the joint surplus would reduce if the agents are more sensitive 
to peer pressure, unless they are equally efficient. Similar to the first best 
situation, the consequential production distortion hurts the joint welfare if 
the sensitivities are strengthen. 
5.3 Negative fixed payment is not allowed 
As mentioned before, a negative fixed payment a i is observed in franchise 
type organization, but it is not popular in labour contracts. Usually a non-
negative fixed wage with commission is offered. Risk aversion of the labour 
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is one of the reason. Besides, similar to the case of L {3i > 1, a negative ai 
may provide the principal an opportunity of cheating the agents. Actually, 
this trick is often used to beguile part-time or summer job seekers into giving 
the swindlers large sums of money. In many reported cases, the swindlers 
claim that they are scou ing for potential models or actors. They ask the 
victims to pay some money for training courses or something else and wait 
for their call. Unfortunately the victims do not receive any job offer. For 
this reason, revenue sharing contract with a negative fixed payment may 
not be considered for some people in reality, especially when the employer is 
little-known. 
If we add the constraint ai > 0 in to the model, then the optimization 
problem of the principal becomes: 
st. 1 2 1 2 QA + {3 A(eA + eB)- 2</>AeA- 2p(eA- eB) > 0 
1 2 1 2 
QB + {38 (eA + eB)- 2<j>BeB- 2p(eB- eA) > 0 
{3A - cfJAeA - p(eA- eB) = 0 
PB - <i>BeB- p(eB- eA) = 0 







Again, inequalities (22) and (23) are the participation constraints of the 
two agents, while equations (24) and (25) are the incentive compatibility 
constraints for this problem. 
Since the fixed payments ai have to be non-negative, equality may not 
hold for equations (22) and (23) even the principal has all the bargaining 
power. However, given the model setting like this, we can see that ai = 0 
in this case. By substituting the IC conditions (24) and (25) into the utility 
functions of each player, we can show that Pi( ei +ej)- ~c/Jie;- ~ p( ei- ej )2 > 0 
if ei > ej. This means the agent, who is asked to exert more effort, would earn 
a positive utility even he receives no fixed salary. Thus the profit maximizing 
principal must offer that agent a contract with no fixed salary. Besides, the 
other agent, who is exerting less effort, would be motivated if the fixed part 
of income is translated into commission. Then peer pressure experienced 
by both parties would be reduced, so the principal can increase his profit 
by compensating that agent using commission rather than fixed salary. For 
these reasons, both agents receive no fixed payment at equilibrium, i.e. aA = 
aB = 0. 
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J.~s the objective function is not quasi-concave, Kuhn- Tucker conditions 
may not be necessary in this model. For this reason, the problem would be 
solve graphically. By substituting ai = 0 and the IC conditions into the profit 





UA = f3A (1A + 2p)f3B + (1B + 2p)f3A- 1A( (1B + p)f3A + pf3B )2 
1A1B + P1A + P1B 2 1A1B + P1A + P1B 
_!!__( 1Bf3A-1Af3B )2>0 
2 1A1B+P1A+P1B -
UB = f3B (1A + 2p) f3B + (1B + 2p)f3A- 1B ( (1A + p)f3B + Pf3A )2 
1A1B + P1A + P1B 2 1A1B + P1A + P1B 
_ !!__ ( 1 B f3 A - 1 Af3 B ) 2 > O 
2 1A1B + P1YA + P1YB -
Let the superscript RS denotes opti1nal solution for revenue sharing vvith 
the constraint ai > 0. When the two agents are equally efficient, i.e. 1 A = 
1B = 1, as mentioned before, the utility levels of both agents woul~ be 
strictly positive. If we only consider the symmetric equilibrium, then U jf8 = 
URS 0 RS RS 1 d f3RS f3RS 0 25 B > ' eA = eB = 44>' an A = B = . . 
Figure ( 4) shows the shape of the profit function where qy A < cpB. As 
we can see, the principal would offer a high commission rate to the efficient 
agent if he faces no participation constraint. If it is possible to employ only 
one agent to work on the project so that peer pressure is elin1inated, then the 
principal vvould hire the efficient agent only. However, if the principal want 
to employ an additional inefficient agent and assign him into the production 
team for some reasons, e.g. to train him to be efficient type, then e B = 0 
could not be optimal as UB < 0 with aB = 0. 
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Figure 4. Profit of the principal against the commission rates, where 
negative ai is not allowed 
By expanding the utility functions U A and U B, \Ve could find that U A > 0 
if f3 A > f3 B. As the principal prefers efficient agent to the inefficient one, 
he would like to increase f3 A until the participation constraint for player B 
becomes binding. Then we have U;{8 > UfJS = 0 if 1>A < 1>n· As shown in 
section (9.2), we could solve the problem and the solution is summarized as 
follow. 
-- -- - --
f3RS f3RS d f3RS f3RS . f I A + B = 0.5 an A > B 1 cp A < (j)B 
2(cpAcpB + cfJAP + c/JnP) 
2<PAf3~s + p 
2( </J A</JB + 1> AP + 1>nP) 
> e~s if cp A < cp B 
Again, since L f3f-S < 1, according to proposition ( 1), both agents would 
be under production as they have not enough motivation to maximize the 
joint profit. 
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Proposition 4 If negative fixed payment is not allowed, then the efficient 
agent exerts more effort and receives a higher commission rate {high-powered 
incentive) than the inefficient one. Moreover, both of them experience the 
peer pressure if they are heterogeneous. However, they exert the same level 
of effort and split the revenue evenly if they are equally competent. [Proof is 
shown in section (9.2)] 
By proposition (1), (2) and ( 4), we can see that the efficient agent is 
asked to exert more effort even there are different constraints on a i and 
f3i· However, different people would receive the higher commission rate with 
these constraints. 
dll RS { < 0 if cP B > cP A 
dp = 0 ifcjJB = cPA (32) 
Again, there would be a reduction in the joint profit when the agents 
are more sensitive to peer pressure, unless they are identical in terms of 
production cost. This result also gives an implication on team formation. 
Suppose two separated teams of two have to be formed, and there are two 
efficient agents and two inefficient agents. If agents with similar ability are 
assigned to the same team, then the profit would equal to that with no 
peer pressure. However, if two identical teams are formed, the resulting 
profit would be less than the case without peer pressure. This means intra-
team variation in efficiency would be minimized by the principal in order to 
maximize his own profit. 
5.4 Implications on human resource investment 
In order to apply the above results, a simplified scenario would be studied. 
Suppose there are only two type of agents, A and B , in terms of efficiency. 
Then following the setting above, the efficiency term cPi for type i agent is 
assumed to take either one of the two discrete values, cjJ A and cPB, while 
cPB > cjJ A in this section. Negative fixed payment a i is not allowed. 
If both agents are efficient type, their utility levels are URS. If both agents 
are inefficient type, their utility levels become U RS. If the team is formed by 
one efficient agent and one inefficient agent , then the former gets U JfB and 










Since <PB > <P A' the follo,ving results are summarized [Proofs are shown 
in section (9.2)]: 
dURS 
3. d</JAB < 0 
Let say the inefficient agents could become efficient if they invest in their 
human resource. Without peer pressure, the agents would like to invest by 
themselves if investment cost is low enough. However, when peer pressure is 
experienced by the agents, making an investment is not always an optimal 
choice for them even no cost is needed. It is possible that the agents do not 
want to be outstanding in order to avoid strong peer pressure. 
For the team formed by different type of agents, the inefficient one would 
like to improve his efficiency in order to gain a better payoff. This is because 
the inefficient agent in the pair receive zero utility, but earn some rent if 
he is not less efficient than his partner. This implies peer pressure with 
in the team could provide incentive for the inefficient agents to catch up 
with the efficient one. Besides, for the team formed by homogeneous agents, 
URs > U RS implies that they would like to become efficient simultaneously if 
little investment is needed. Moreover, up> uRS implies that the agents are 
willing to invest individually, even their partners are not expected to invest 
in human resource. This means the e1nployers do not need to participate in 
the training process, unless it is firm-specific or the employees could not do 
it by themselves. 
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5 .5 Implications on players' preference for a new mem-
ber 
The above results are also related to the recruitment processes. In many 
situations, existing staffs are responsible to recruit new members, so moral 
hazard may happen if there is conflict of interest between the employer and 
the existing staffs. The above results show that ~:s < 0, which implies 
efficient agents would like to find an efficient partner. However, as uRS > 
ufjs = 0, the inefficient agents prefer an inefficient one. Since a~:s < 0 
and a~Rs < 0, the employers always prefer efficient type. This means peer 
pressur:. could be an obstacle to hiring new members who are better qualified 
than the existing staffs. This may explain why "birds of a feather flock 
together" in the job market. 
6 Fixed Wage Contract with Supervision un-
der Peer Pressure 
When fixed wage contracts are used, the principle has to announce his tar-
get effort level ex ante. If he has sufficient evidences to prove the shirking 
behaviour of one specific agent, he could fire that employee without any 
compensation and also punishment. Therefore, shirking agent gets nothing 
if he is caught. Otherwise, the principal pays wi to each agent respectively. 
Hard \Vorking agent always gets wi, while shirking agent may be fired at a 
probability of Qi· For simplicity, Qi is assumed to be the percentage difference 
between the true effort and the target in this paper. 
if t · > e · 
'/, - '/, 
if t · < e· 
'/, - '/, 
The optimization problem faced by agent i: 
if t i > ei 
if t i < ei (OP7) 
Given the target t i and wage wi , agent i maxi1nizes his own utility as the 
above optimization problem. For the agent who is exerting more effort, ~~i < 
0 if ti < ei. This is because the agent would not receive a higher expected 
wage by exceeding the given target, but he would increase his production 
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cost by doing so. Thus this agent would never exert an effort exceeding the 
given target, i.e. t i > ei . However, for the agent who is exerting less effort, 
~~: could be positive when t i < ei, as he may reduce the peer pressure by 
exceeding the given target. For these reasons, there could be two possible 
observations: 1) no agent exceeds the targets; or 2) only one agent exceeds 
the given target. As Qi is not smooth at t i = ei , it is difficult to study both 
cases at the same time. For simplicity, the case with no agent exceeding the 
target would be studied first, and then that with one agent exceeding the 
target would be explored. 
6.1 No agent exceeding the target 
In this subsection, we focus on the case that no agent exceeds their given 
targets. Given the target t i and wage w i , agent i maximizes his own utility 
by satisfying the following conditions. 
aui wi 
- = - - A- .e · - p(e· - e ·) > 0 
a t 'Pt t t 1 -e· . t t 
t i > ei 




Conditions (33) to (35) are the Kuhn- Tucker conditions for the utility 
maximization problem for agent i, where i = A , B. ICi could be positive 
when there is a corner solution, i.e . t i = ei . Moreover, as 8£Zi = -qyi - p < 0, 
the objective function is strictly concave, so the first order conditions above 
are sufficient. Besides, since qy and pare positive, the incentive compatibility 
constraints generate a N ash Equilibrium for this simultaneous game, as shown 
in the phase diagram below. 
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Figure 5. Best response of the agents receiving fixed wage, with no agent 
exceeding the target 
Then the principal maximizes his profit based on the expected responses 
of the agents. 
max II = L [ei - (1 - qi)wi - kti] 
t ,e ,w . 
(OP8) 
't 
st. ICi > 0 
ti > e· 't 
(ti- ei)ICi 0 
ui > 0 
Since the objective function is not quasi concave and the Kuhn- Thcker 
conditions may not be necessary conditions in this case, we have to simplify 
the problem and solve it case by case. 
Firstly, if effort exerted is less than the target , i.e. ti > ei , the princi-
pal could make more profit by reducing the wage wi and target ti without 
changing ~ii. This means wage and monitoring cost could be reduced without 
affecting incentive. Thus the principal always set a target that his agents are 
willing to meet, so ti = ei at equilibrium. 
Secondly, if the participation constraint for one agent is binding, i.e. Ui = 
0, by substituting Ui into ICi, we have 
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1 2 1 2 2 e·IC· = __ rh. .e . - -p(e- - e-)> 0 
t t 2 o/t t 2 t J -
For this reason, the agent, who receives no rent, must be exerting less 
effort than his partner ( e1 > ei)· In that situation, the utility of his partner 
must be positive (U1 > 0). This implies the two participation constraints 
would not be both binding. 
Thirdly, if JCi > 0 and Ui > 0, the principal could increase his profit 
by reducing Wi· For this reason, either incentive compatibility constraint 
or participation constraint would be binding at equilibrium, i.e. ui = 0 if 
ICi > 0. 
Based on these results, three cases are studied as below. 
Case 1: suppose ICi > 0, IC1 = 0, Ui = 0 and U1 > 0 
Then the principal's optimization problem becomes: 
max L[(l- k)ei- wi] 
e,w . 
?. 
Let the superscript M denotes optimal solution for the fixed -vvage con-
tracts with both agents being supervised. Then efl and ef-1 are derived as 
below. [Proof is shown in section (9.3).] 
(1- k)(if;i + 3p) 
(2if;j + 3p) ( if;i + p) - p2 
(1- k)(2if;j + 5p) 
Since it is assumed that Ui = 0, this implies ef1 > ef-1, so j has to be 
player A to avoid contradiction. By substituting the solutions into ICi, we 
can see that ICi > 0 only if q;if < <i>B· This means a non-binding incentive 
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compatibility constraint could not give an equilibrium unless the difference 
in efficiency between the agents is sufficiently large. 
4>¥ = (24>A + 5p)2- 6p2 + (24>A + 5p)J(24>A + 5p)2- Sp2 (36) 
2p 
Case 2: suppose ICA = ICB = 0, UA > 0 and UB > 0 
In this case, both agents face a binding IC and earn a positive rent. Then 
the principal's optimization problem becomes: 






As shown in section (9.4), we can see that the efficient agent is asked to 
exert more effort. 
elvi 
A 
(1- k)(qyB + 2p) 
2(1JA1JB + 1JAP + 1JBP) 
(1- k)(qyA + 2p) 
By substituting the solutions into U B, it is shown that U B > 0 only if 
q;B < 1;~. This means the heterogeneity in agent 's ability has to be small 
enough, otherwise the agents could not earn a positive rent together. 
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Case 3: suppose ICi = IC1 = 0, Ui = 0 and Ui > 0 
In this case, both IC are binding while one of the agents earns a positive 
rent. The principal's optimization problem becomes: 




As shown in section (9.5), the optimal efforts could be solved as below. 
Since the principal could earn more by extracting the rent of player B, so 
i = Band j = A. 
e?vf 
't 
(1- k)[1 + p0.5(cpi + p) - 0.5] 
2[cpj + 2p- 2pl.5(cpi + p) - 0.5] 
(1- k)p0.5(cpi + p) - 0.5[1 + P0.5(cpi + p) - 0.5] 
2[cpj + 2p- 2p1.5( cpi + p )- 0.5] 
Since case 3 has one more equality constraint than case 1 and case 2, case 
3 is relevant only if cp~ < </JB < <P-Jf. Based on section (9.3), (9.4) and (9 .5), 
the results are summarized in table ( 4) below. 
Table 4. Summary: fixed wage contracts with both agents being monitored 
if cpA = cpB UA > 0 UB > 0 elj = e-J/ w11 = w-Jf 
if cpA < cpB < cp~ UA > 0 UB > 0 eM> eM A B wM>wM A B 
if q;l < q; < q;ll B- B- B UA > 0 UB = O eM> eM A B wM>wM A B 
if cpYJ < cpB UA > 0 Us = 0 eM> eM A B wM>wM A B 
Figure (6) below shows that ho"' </J~ and <P-Jf vary "'ith the sensitivity to 
peer pressure p. Besides, by equation (37), it could be shown that c/JB < c/Jk 
for all p if cpB < 5.83</JA. This means both agents would receive positive rent 
if cost of the efficient agent is more than 17.2% of that of the inefficient one. 
In other words, only case 2 is relevant when the heterogeneity in efficiency 
is not too strong. For simplicity, </J B < 5.83</J A is assumed in the following 
parts of this paper, which i1nplies the intra-team variation in efficiency is 
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not too large. It is reasonable because basic techniques are usually easy to 
learn even for new corners, so the difference in cost between agents should 
not be too high. Besides, as shown in the previous section, the principal 
has incentive to minimize the intra-team variation in efficiency. Although 
this incentive may be weakened by the potential catch up of the inefficient 
agent in the future, or the huge searching cost of finding a better employee, 
it see1ns that cjJB > 5.83cp A is not so reasonable. Because the principal has an 
alternative of breaking the team and ask the agents to work independently. 
Given this assumption, both agents would receive positive rent and have 
a binding incentive compatibility constraint if they are being supervised. 
Then the corresponding profit function and the utility functions would be 
differentiable with respect to p. 
y 
A.JT y = 'f'B 
1-' 
Figure 6. cp~ and cp-Jf against the sensitivity to peer pressure p 
Proposition 5 In the case of fixed wage with both agents being supervised, 
the competent agent exerts more effort and receives a higher wage {high-
powered incentive) than the incompetent one. Both of them experience the 
peer pressure if they are heterogeneous. However, they exert the san~e level 
of effort and receive equal wage rate if they are equally competent. [Proofs 
are shown in section {9.3), (9.4} and (9.5}} 
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dii M { < 0 ~f <Pn > <P A 
dp = 0 If <Pn = <P A (38) 
Again, there would be a reduction in the principal's profit when the agents 
are more sensitive to peer pressure, unless they are identical in terms of 
production cost. This gives a similar implication on team formation as in the 
case of revenue sharing. Intra-team variation in efficiency would be minimized 
by the principal if two separated teams have to be formed. 
6.2 One agent exceeding the target 
Suppose ti < ei and t1 > e1 at equilibrium for some given targets and wages, 
i.e. player i exceeds his target but player j does not. Then ei and e1 have to 
satisfied the following conditions. 




= _!_- £h.e · - p(e·- e· ) > 0 
:::l t 'f'J J J t -ue· · J J 
t· > e· J- J 
au-(t·- e·)-1 = 0 
J J oe. 
J 
For agent i: 






Conditions (39) to ( 41) are the Kuhn- Tucker conditions for problem 
( OP7) of agent j. Equation ( 42) is the first order condition for problem 
(OP7) of agent i. These conditions are also the incentive compatibility con-
straints for the principal's problem. For inequality (39) , ~~~ could be positive 
J 
when we have a corner solution, i.e. t1 = e1. 
As a;~i = -cpi - p < 0 and a;~i = -cfJ1 - p < 0, the objective function U 
t J 
is strictly concave, so the first order conditions above are sufficient. Besides, 
as c/Ji and p are positive, the incentive compatibility constraints generate a 
Nash Equilibrium for this simultaneous game as shown in the diagram below. 
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Figure 7. Best response of the agents receiving fixed wage, with one agent 
exceeding the target 
Then the principal maximizes his profit based on the expected responses 
of the agents. 
(OP9) 
w · 
st. f -qy1e1- p(ej- ei ) > 0 
J 
w · (tj - ej)[ f -qy1ej - p( e1 - ei )] 0 
J 
- qyiei - p( ei - ej) 0 
ti < e· ~ 
t · J > e · J 
ui, u 1 > 0 
Before solving the optimization problem, we may make the problem easier 
to solve by ruling out some conditions. 
Firstly, if effort exerted by agent j is less than the target, i.e. t1 > e1, 
the principal could increase his profit by reducing the wage w1 and target 
t1 without changing ~~. This means wage and monitoring cost could be J 
reduced without affecting the marginal return of effort for the agents. For 
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this reason, the principal always set a target that his agents are willing to 
meet, so t1 = ei at equilibrium. 
Secondly, ~~~ and Uj would not be both positive. Otherwise, the principal 
J 
could make more profit by reducing 'Wj, so that ~~~ and U1 would be reduced J 
without reaching the lower bound. And then, by equation ( 42), we have 
ei = ~ej < ej. According to section (9.6), Ui > 0 if~~; > 0. This means 
au1 0 t 'lib · Be - = a equ1 num. 
J 
Finally, as agent i is expected to exert more effort than what he is asked 
to provide, so this target level is irrelevant to his decision. The principal 
would simply set ti = 0 to save the monitoring cost. This means agent i 
would receive no supervision. Then his only motivation is to reduce the cost 
of peer pressure experienced. Thus the principal does not need to offer agent 
i a positive rent. This implies a binding participation constraint for agent i. 
Then the principal's optimization problem becomes: 





Let the superscript M denotes optimal solution for the fixed wage con-
tracts with one agent not being supervised. According to section (9.6), the 
we have the following results: 
(1-k)(<Pi+p)+p 
( 3p</Ji + 2p</Jj + 2</Ji</Jj) 
p ~ 
---e¥ (<Pi + p) J 
As mentioned at the beginning of section ( 6), the principal may choose to 
monitor both agents or monitor only one of them. By comparing II M with 
IIl\1/ (steps are shoVtrn is section (9.7)), \Ve can see that the principal could 
earn more profit by supervising only one agent when the monitoring cost is 
too high. If supervising an agent is sufficiently expensive, the principal vvould 
only monitor the incompetent player as shown in figure (8) belovv. The major 
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reason is that competent agent is more likely to exert a high effort under no 
supervision, due to his low cost of production. 
[(1- k)(cpi + p) + PF 
2 (3pcpi + 2pcpj + 24Jic/Jj) (p + c/Ji) 
(1- k) 2 (cpA + c/JB + 4p) 
4( cfJ Ac/JB + cfJ AP + c/JBP) 
rrM - rr~B < o if k > kB 
rrM - rrJ!,B > o if k < kB 
1'}A'!. ·riSJ' .~_ - }=E 
Figure 8a. The principal monitors only one of the agents if monitoring cost 
is high, kA > kB 
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+ 
Figure 8b. kB > kA 
Proposition 6 The principal would like to supervise only one of the agents 
if the monitoring cost is high. B esides, if monitoring cost is sufficiently high, 
then only the inefficient agent would be supervised. [Proof is shown in section 
{9.1}} 
However , in reality, we seldom find an agent vvho are receiving fixed vvage 
wit hout supervision. It seems that some other contracts, such as revenue 
sharing, would work better if the monitoring cost is too high. This would be 
discussed in section (7) in detail. 
6.3 Implications on human resource investment 
According to section (7) later, fixed wage contract with only one agent being 
supervised is inferior to revenue sharing contract. Thus, only the case wit h 
both agents being monitored is studied here. By differentiating the profit 
function IT M and the utility functions u iM' we could get the following results: 
arrM arrM 
-- < 0 and -- < 0 f)rpA 8rpB 
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auf auf 
-- < 0 and -- < 0 8cpA 8cpB 
aulf 0 d aulf 0 --> an--< 
8cpA 8cpB 
This 1neans the principal and the competent agent would be better off 
if either one of the agents improves his efficiency. Suppose the agents could 
improve their efficiency if they invest in their human resource. ~~~ < 0 and 
~~: < 0 imply that both agents are willing to invest independently if it is 
not too expensive. Similar to the case of revenue sharing, peer pressure does 
not affect the agents' decision about human resource investment. 
B ·d h · h · · h au; 0 esi es, t e Incompetent agent as an Incentive to catc up as Bcf;s < . 
For this reason, small heterogeneity of labour may be acceptable for principals 
who care about future payoff, although this heterogeneity hurt current profit. 
6.4 Implications on players' preference for a new mem-
ber 
Similar to section (5.5), the above results also imply a conflict of interest 
between the employer and the existing staffs in the recruitment processes. 
~~! < 0 rneans that competent agent would be better off if his partner is 
more efficient, so he would like to find an efficient partner. On the contrary, 
~~: > 0 means that incompetent agent would be worse off if his partner 
is more efficient. This implies the incompetent agent would like to find an 
incompetent partner, who is identical to him in terms of efficiency. For these 
reasons, if the existing staff are responsible to recruit new members, they 
always try to hire someone who are similar to the1n. However, as the em-
ployers prefer efficient type, there is a potential moral hazard in recruitment 
process, which is similar to the case of revenue sharing. 
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7 The Choice between Revenue Sharing and 
Fixed Wage 
Since the profit gained from supervision ~ecreases with monitoring cost k, 
there is a critical level of monitoring cost k such that: 
IIRS > rrM if k > k 
ITRS rrM ..-... if k = k 
ITRS < rrM if k<k 
..-... 
If we assume <PB < 5.83</J A as in the previous section, we could solve k by 
equation ( 43) below. 
(l- k)2 = 2(</JB- </JA){3A + </JA + 2p < l 
</JA + </JB + 4p 
(43) 
Based on the assumption that <PB > </>A > p, k must be less than 0.4 
for any </> and p. This means the principal always chooses to share the 
revenue with his agents if the monitoring cost k is above 0.4. As shown in 
the appendix, kA and kB is larger than 0.4, so we have: 
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Figure 9a. The principal shares the revenue if k > k. (with kA > kB) 
Figure 9b. The principal shares the revenue if k > k. (with kB > kA) 
For this reason, if the monitoring cost is so high that supervising only the 
inefficient agent make more profit than supervising both of them, then the 
principal prefers revenue sharing to supervision. This means the principal 
either shares the revenue with or monitors both agents. This may explain 
why incentive scheme is necessary to motivate the agents in most of the daily 
observations, even peer pressure exists. 
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Proposition 7 Other things being constant, fixed wage contact would be cho-
sen if the monitoring cost is low, while the principal would like to share the 
revenue if the monitoring cost is high. [Proof is shown in section (9.8)} 
dk 
- > 0 if 4J A -j- cj> B dp (44) 
This means the principal tends to supervise if the agents are more sensi-
tive to peer pressure, but tends to share the revenue if the sensitivity to peer 
pressure is low. One possible explanation is that participation constraint for 
incompetent agent is binding if the revenue is shared. Thus production dis-
tortion occurs if the agents are sensitive to peer pressure, not only because 
the principal want to reduce the peer pressure, but also because he has to 
compensate the incompetent agent by offering him a higher commission rate. 
Proposition 8 For a given level of monitoring cost, the principal tends to 
offer fixed wages if the agents are more sensitive to peer pressttre, but tends 
to share the revenue if the sensitivity to peer pressure is low. [Proof is shown 
in section (9.8}} 
This fits with our observations in the agricultural industry. According to 
Lueck and Alien (1992) , landlords usually rent their farms to or share the 
crops with skilled farmers, but offer fixed wages to tmskilled labors. It is 
believed that sharecropping is more efficient if the cost of monitoring and 
constraining the farmers is too high, since the farmers may overuse and ex-
haust the land. If the landlords prefer sharecropping simply because of the 
high monitoring cost, then the low skilllabors should not always receive fixed 
wages. However, based on the model in this paper, high peer pressure in the 
lab or intensive environment may explain the phenomenon. Since the lovv skill 
labors are mainly hired for irrigation and harvest , they have to work closely 
with their partners. A strong peer pressure is expected. On the contrary, the 
major task of skill farmers is to select a right crop and suitable cultivating 
plan, so the relation between peers is weaker. Thus fixed vvages are offered 
to low skilllabors even it is expensive to monitor the farmers. 
Besides, the result here also matches with the fact that salespersons or 
marketing staffs are more likely to receive commissions based on team rev-
enue, while their supporting staffs usually be compensated by fixed wages. 
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It is true that sales revenue is strongly related to the performance of mar-
keting staffs, but there is also a tight linkage between the revenue and the 
efficiency of the back office. One possible explanation is that front office staffs 
spend most of the time with customers while back office staffs have to work 
with their peers closely, so the former care little about their teammates but 
the latter are sensitive to the actions of their partners. Thus supervision is 
widely used in supporting units even the sale revenue is also is an informative 
measure of their efficiency. 
In previous literature, the phenomena above are usually explained by the 
difference in monitoring costs, similar to proposition (7), i.e. crop is shared 
·with skilled farmers simply because the cost of monitoring them is higher 
than monitoring the low skill labors. Here, I am not arguing that difference 
in monitoring cost is not an explanation for the choice between contracts, 
but it seems that some further empirical studies of the relation between peer 
pressure and contractual arrangement are valuable. 
8 Conclusion 
It has long been believed that monitoring cost is the critical factor deter-
mining whether revenue sharing or supervision should be implemented. By 
a simple model above, this paper shows that agents' sensitivities to peer 
pressure could also affect our contractual arrangement. When heterogeneous 
agents need to work closely with their peers, the principal may choose to 
supervise even monitoring is expensive. However , since specific functional 
forms are used in this model, further theoretical works are necessary to make 
it more convincing. 
9 Appendix 
st. f3 A - cp A eA - p( eA - e B) = 0 










0 0 1 -1A -p p 
0 0 -1 p -1B -p 
IHI = 1 -1 0 0 0 <0 
-1A- p p 0 -1A- 2p 2p 
p -1B -p 0 2p -1B- 2p 
Let the superscript RS denotes optimal solution for revenue sharing with 
the constraint L /3 i < 1. 
11 + 2p1A + 2p1B 
(1A + 1B)(1A1B + 2p1A + 2p1B) 
1~ + 2p1A + 2p1B 
( ep A + epB)( ep AepB + 2pep A + 2pepB) 
2 2 2 pep A + pep B + 2 pep A ep B + ifJ A ifJ B 
( ifJ A + epB) (2p</J A + 2p</JB + if; A epB) 
ep~ + ifJ1 + 1 AifJB + 6pep A+ 6p1B 
2 ( ep A + ifJB) (2p</J A + 2p1B + ifJ A ifJB) 
(epA + epB) (2pepA + 2p1B + 1A1B)- 2(p1~ + 1A11 + 2pepAepB + P11) 
epAepB (1A- ifJB) < 0 
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h { 
(3 A > ~ > (3 B if cp B > </J A 
so we ave 1 . (3 A = 2 = (3 B If cp B = cp A 




UA = (3A (cj;>A + 2p)(3B + (cj;>B + 2p)(3A 
</J A </J B + p</J A + p</J B 
_ cpA( (cpB + p)(3A + p(3B )2 _ f!_( cpB(3A- cpA(3B )2 > 0 
2 cp A </J B + p</J A + p</J B 2 </J A </J B + pep A + pep B -
UB = (3B (cfJA + 2p)(3B +(<PE+ 2p)(3 A 
cp A</JB + p</J A+ p</JB 
_ </JB ( (cpA + p)(3B + p(3A )2 _ f!_( </JB(3A- cpA(3B )2 > 0 
2 <PAc/JB + PcfJA + pc/JB 2 <PA1B + P1A + P<PB -
By substituting the two re into u A and u B' we have: 
2(</JA<PB + P<PA + PcfJB) 2UA = (<PAcfJ1 + 4</JA<PBP + cfJ1P + 3</JAP2 + 4cfJBP2 )f3~ 
+2 (</JA + p) (</JA</JB + </JAp + 2</JBp) (3 A(3B- </JAp(</JA + p) (3~ 
Then U A > 0 if and only if 
f3 A > - (cpA + p) (</JA</JB + cpAp + 2</JBp) + (</JA</JB + cpAp + cpBp) J(</JA + p) (cpA + 4p) 
(3B - (</JA</J1 + 4</JA</JBP + </J1P + 3c/JAP2 + 4</JBP2) 
where 
l - (cpA + p) (</JA</JB + </JAP + 2</JBP) + (</JA</JB + </JAP + </JBP) J(cpA + p) (</JA + 4p) > O 
> (</JA</J1 + 4</JA</JBP + </J~p + 3</JAP2 + 4</JBp2 ) -
This means U A > 0 if (3 A > (3B, and UA = 0 only if (3 A < (3B . Besides, 
since A and B are symmetric, U B > 0 if (3 B > (3 A, and U B = 0 only if 
(3B < PA· 
51 
As mentioned before, UA > Un = 0 at equilibrium, so OP6 is equivalent 
to: 
where 
R - - (if;B + p) (if;Aif;B + ifJBP + 2ifJAP) + (if;Aif;B + ifJAP + ifJBP) J(q;B + p) (if;B + 4p) 
1
- (if;Bif;~ + 4if;AifJBP + </J~p + 3ifJBP2 + 4ifJAP2) 
Let the superscript RS denotes optimal solution for revenue sharing with 
the constraint ai > 0. By the first order condition, we get: 
where R2 
1 
2(1 + R1) 
0.5- {3~5 
2if;B{3~s + p 
2(ifJAifJB + ifJAP + ifJBP) 
21'; AP~s + p 
2( ifJB - if; A)P~5 + if; A + 2p 
4( ifJ A ifJB + cP AP + ifJBP) 
p (ifJB + 4p) +(if; A+ 2p)yi(if;B + p) (ifJB + 4p) 
4R2 
pif>~ + 2p2 if>A - P</J1 + 2p2 if>B - if> A ifJ1 + if;~ if;B + pif; A if;B 
+ (if>Aif>B + if>AP + if>BP) V(if>B + p) (if>B + 4p) 
2 (if> A if> B + pif> A + pif> B) 2 U A 
(if> A if>~+ 4cj;AifJBP + if>~p + 3if>AP2 + 4if>BP2 ){3~ 
2 




3 (</>A - </>n) </>n [ ( </>B</>~ + 4</> AP2 + </>~p 
8R~J(</>B + p) (</>B + 4p) 
+5</>BP2 + 8p3 + 4</>A</>Bp) + 2p(</>A + 2p) J(</>B + p) (</>B + 4p)] 
< 0 
diTRS -1 2 2 
d</> A 4R§ {2p ( 4p +</>B) (p +</>B) (2p +</>A) + ( </> A</>B + 4p </>A 
+p</>~ + 4p</JA</>B + 5p2</>B + 8p3)J(</>B + p) (</>B + 4p)} 
< 0 
-1 
-::---------;================== { 64p5 + 3 p2 </>~ + 4p3</>~ - 2 p2</> 1 
8R§j(</>B + p) (</>B + 4p) 
-9p3</>1- 2</>~</>1 + 56p4 </> A+ 48p4</>B- 4p</> A</>1 + 3p</>~</>B 
+27 p3</> A</>B- 15p</>~</>1- 24p2</> A</>1- 9p2 </>~</>B + 2(16p4 
+ 7 p2</>~ + p2</>~ + c/J~ </>~ + 14p3</> A + 2p3</>B + 2p</> A</>~ + 5pc/J~ </>B 











8(R3 + R4) 2 
R3 p</>~ + 2p21>A- P1>1 + 2p21>B -1>A1>1 + 1>~1>B + P1>A1>B 
R4 (c/JAc/JB + 1>AP + c/JBP) J(cpB + p) (c/JB + 4p) 
R5 -p2 1>~ - 4p3</>~- 3p3</>~ -1>~1>1 + 24p4 </> A+ 24p4 c/JB 
-2pcp~</>B + 15p3</>A</>B- 7p</>~</>1- 9p2</>A</>1- llp2 </>~c/JB 
,--------
R6 - 2 (p + c/JA) (p</>~ + 6p21>A + 6p2c/JB + c/J~cpB + 6pcpAcfJB) J(cpB + p) (c/JB + 4p) 
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As(4</>sR6-6R3R4)2 - [3(m+R~)-4<PnRsJ2 > Oand4c/JsR6-6R3R4 > 0, 
souRs< u;:s. 
-1 
3 (3p3c/J~ + 6p4cjJ~ + 240p6c/J~ 
8 (R3 + R4) J(p + cPB) (4p + <PB) 
+156p6c/J1 + 192p7c/JA + 192p7c/JB + 588p6c/JAcPB + 3pc/J~c/J1 
+6p2 c/J~c/JB + 9p5 c/JAc/J1 + 102p5 c/J~</>B - 84p5 </>~ - 30p4c/J~ 
-93p5 c/J1 - 6c/J~c/J~- 48pc/J~c/J~ - 42p</>~c/J1- 96p3c/JAcP~- 18p3c/J~c/JB 
-429p4c/JAc/J1- 372p4c/J~c/JB -108p2c/J~c/J~ - 327p2 c/J~c/J1- 60p2 c/J~c/J1 
-62lp3c/J~c/J1- 567 p3c/J~11- 651p4c/J~11) 
+3-J 4p2 + c/J1 + 5pc/JB(6p3c/J~ + 50p4c/J~ + 40lc/J~ + 10/c/J1 + 6lc/J1 
+2c/J~c/J1 + 32p6c/JA + 32p6c/JB + 78p5 c/JAc/JB + 16pc/J~c/J1 + 9pc/J~c/J1 
+13p2 c/J~c/JB + 32p3c/JAc/J1 + 103p3c/J~c/JB + 63p4c/JAc/J1 + 136p4c/J~c/JB 
+36p2 c/J~c/J1 + 69p2 c/J~11 + 117p3c/J~11) 
< 0 
9.3 Fixed wage with supervision, OP8, easel 
Case 1: suppose ICi > 0, IC1 = 0, Ui = 0 and U1 > 0 




IHI -(2c/Jj + 3p) 2p 
2p -(c/Ji+P) >0 
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Let the superscript M denotes optimal solution for the fixed wage con-
tracts with both agents being supervised. Then e"f and efl are derived as 
below. 
(1- k)(<Pi + 3p) 
( 2 <P j + 3 p) (<Pi + p) - p2 
(1 - k)(2</Jj + 5p) 
Since it is assumed that Ui = 0, this implies ef" > efl, so j has to be 
player A to avoid contradiction. 
(1- k)(</JB + 3p) 
(2</J A+ 3p)( </JB + p) - p2 
(1- k)(2</JA + 5p) 
Hence the efficient agent exerts more effort than his partner. By substi-
tuting the solutions into ICB, we can see that ICB > 0 only if <P§f < <PB· 
WB 
-- </JBeB- p(eB- eA) 
eB 
(k- 1)2 {p</J1- (19p2 + 20p</JA + 4</J~)</JB- (16p3 + 20p2cpA + 4pcp~)} 
2e'j (2p2 + 2p</JA + 3pcpB + 2cpAcpB) 2 
where 
(k- 1)2 (3p + <PB) (P<PB- 2p2 + pep A+ <PB<PA) 
(2p2 + 3pcpB + 2pcp A+ 2cpB</J A)2 
( k - 1 )2 ( 4p3 + 21p2</JB + 8p2cp A + pc/J1 + 16pcpBcp A + 4pcp~ + 4cpBc/J~) 
2 (2p2 + 3p</JB + 2p</J A + 2</JB</J A)2 
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'WA -WB 
(k- 1)2 (24YA4Y1 + P4Y1-16p3 - 2p24JA- 19p24JB- 4pqy~- 8p4JA4YB- 4cp~c/JB) 
2 (2p2 + 2pcp A+ 3p</JB + 2cp AcpB) 2 
Since cpB > <P§f > 37.87cpA and 1A > p, 
WA-WB 
(k - 1) 2 (74c/JB1~ + P11- 16p3 - 2p2c/JA - 19p2c/JB- 4pcp~- 8p</JA1B - 41~</JB) 
> 
2 (2p2 + 2pcp A+ 3p~B + 2cp A~B) 2 
> 0 





- - < 
dp 
( k - 1) 2 ( 5 p2 + 2 p~ A + 3 pep B + 2~ A </J B) ( 8 p + 2</J A + </J B) 
2 (2p2 + 2p</JA + 3p~B + 2cpAcpB) 2 
- (k- 1)2 ----------~(6~ ~3 +80 4 +24 2 ~2 
2 (2p2 + 2p</JA + 3pcpB + 2cpA~B)3 'f'A'+"B p p '+"A 
+18p24J1 + 8pcp~ + 24p3cpA + 9p~1 + 8~~cpB - 16~~4J1 
-4p3cpB- 22pcpA4J1-12p</J~~B- 96p2 cpA~B) 
- (k- 1)2 ---------------=(222~2 ~2 + 80 4 + 24 2 ~2 
2 ( 2 p2 + 2 p</J A + 3p</J B + 2</J A cp B) 3 A'+" B p p '+"A 
+18p24J1 + 8pcp~ + 24p3cpA + 9p</J1 + 8cp~cpB- 16cp~4J1 
-4p3cpB- 22p~A~1- 12p</J~~B- 96p2cpAcpB) 
< 0 
9.4 Fixed wage with supervision, OP8, case2 
Case 2: suppose ICA = ICE = 0, UA > 0 and UB > 0 
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Then the principal's optimization problem becomes: 





By substituting the constraints into the profit function, we have 
max IT = ( 1 - k) (eA + e B) + 2 peA e B - ( c/J B + p) e1 - ( cP A + p) e ~ 
e 
-(c/JA + p) < 0 
-(c/JA + p) 
2p 
2p > 0 
-(c/JB + p) 
(1- k)(c/JB + 2p) M (1- k)(c/JA + 2p) 
--------------->eB = ---------------
2(1JAcPB + cPAP + cPBP) - 2(1JAcPB + cPAP + cPBP) 
(1- k) 2 (c/JB + 2p) (1- k) 2 (c/JA + 2p) 
--------------- > WB = ---------------
4(c/JAcPB + cPAP + cPBP) - 4(1JAcPB + cPAP + cPBP) 
Therefore the efficient agent receives a higher wage than the inefficient 
one. 
By substituting the solutions into U B, it is shown that U B > 0 only if 









ITM = (1- k)2(epA + epB + 4p) 
4(epAepB + epAp + epBp) 
(k-1)2(epB+2p)2 0 
--------------~2 < 
4 (epAepB + epAp + epBp) 
(k -1)2 (epA + 2p)2 0 
--------------~2 < 
4 (epAepB + epAp + cPBP) 
(k-1)2(epA-epB)2 <0 
4 (epAepB + cPAP + cPBP) 2 
dU A _ ep B ( k - 1) 2 ( 2 P + ep B) ( 4p2 + pepB + 3pep A + cP A ep B) < O 
dc/J A 8 (pep A + p<fy B + </Y A cP B) 3 
d[JA _p(2p+epA)(p+4JA)(k-1)2(epB-epA) <O 
depB 4 (pep A+ pepB + ep AepB) 3 
dUB p(2p+epB)(p+epB)(k-1)2(4JB-epA) >O 
dcp A 4 (pep A+ pepB + cp AepB) 3 
dUB - epA (k- 1)2 (2p + epA) (4p2 +pep A+ 3pepB + epAcpB) < 0 
d<jYB 8 (pqy A+ pcpB + cp AepB) 3 
9.5 Fixed wage with supervision, OP8, case3 
Case 3: suppose ICi = IC1 = 0, Ui = 0 and U1 > 0 
Then the principal's optimization problem becomes: 




By ICi = Ui = 0, we have et = ~e] 
As ~ < 1, ~ = 2(2p~- 2p-1>i) < 0, so the objective function 
IS concave. 
(1- k)[1 + p0.5(1i + p)- 0.5] 
2[1j + 2p- 2pl.5(1i + p) - 0.5] 
(1- k)p0.5(1i + p) - 0.5[1 + p0.5(1i + p) - 0.5] 
2[c/Jj + 2p- 2pl.5( cPi + p )- 0.5] 
~(1- k)2 2p + 1>; + 2,j p2 +Pc/>; 
4 (c/Ji + 2p)(c/Ji + p)- 2p,j P2 + PcPi 
~(1- k)2 2p + c/>; + 2J p2 + P1>; 
4 (c/Ji + p)(cPi + p) + P(cPi + p)- 2py' P2 + PcPi 
Since (c/Jj + p)(c/Ji + p) does not change no matter i = B or i = A, it is 
substituted by M 1 . 
_i_[ 2p + 1>; + 2y' p2 + P1>; ] 
8cpi M1 + p( cpi + p) - 2p,j p2 + pcpi 
(cPicPj + PcPi + PcPi)V P2 + PcPi + P(cPicPj- PcPi + PcPj) > O 
(M1 + p(c/Ji + p)- 2py' P2 + PcPi) 2V P2 + PcPi 
This means the profit would be higher if i = B, so the principal would 
like to extract the rent of player B instead of player A. For this reason, i = B 
and j = A. 
(1- k)[1 + p0.5(c/JB + p) - 0.5] 
2[c/JA + 2p- 2pl.5(cjJB + p) - 0.5] 
(1 _ k)p0.5(c/JB + p) - 0.5[1 + p0.5(c/JB + p) - 0.5] 
2[c/JA + 2p- 2p1.5(c/JB + p) - 0.5] 
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Besides, w;{ - wN = (p + </> A)e~ - (p + <f>B)e1 = </>A e~ > 0 
As case 3 has one more equality constraint than case 1 and case 2, case 
3 is relevant only if </>~ < <f>B < <Pi{. 
9.6 Fixed wage with supervision, OP9 
U· J 
st. 
w·- (<Pj(<Pi + p) + <PiP)e~ > 0 
J <Pi + p J -
w . _ (<PjP2 + P<PI + 2</JjP<Pi + <Pj<PI )e~ > 0 
J 2 (p + <Pi)2 J -
m ax IT - e · + e · - w · - w · - ke · 





By substituting the constraints into the objective function, the problem 
above becomes: 
maxii = (1- k)(<Pi + p) + p e- - (3p</Ji + 2p</Jj + 2</Ji<Pj) e~ 
ej qyi + p J 2 (p + qyi) J 
Let the superscript M denotes optimal solution for the fixed \vage con-
tracts with one agent not being supervised. 
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(1-k)(<Pi+p)+p 
( 3 p</J i + 2 p</J i + 2</J i <Pi) 
p ~ 
---e¥ (<Pi + p) J 
[(1- k)(<Pi + p) + PF 
( 3pcfJ ·+2pcjJ -+2c/J·c/J .) 
Second order condition is fulfilled since t 2(p+
1
c/Ji) t 1 > 0. 
9. 7 W"ho should be supervised? 
Suppose <PB < 5.83</J A 
Then { 
[(1- k)(<Pi + p) + PF 
2 (3p</Ji + 2p<Pj + 2</JicPj ) (p +<Pi) 
(1- k)2(</JA + </JB + 4p) 
4(</JA</JB +<PAP+ <fJB P) 
4 (p + <fJ B) ( <fJ A <fJ B + p</J A + p</J B) ( 2 <fJ A <fJ B + 2 p</J A + 3 p</J B) 
(p + </JB) (2p</J~ + 6p2</J A+ p</J1 + 10p2</JB + 2</J~</JB + 9p</J A</JB) 
4p (p + </JB) ( <fJ A</JB + p</J A+ P<fB) 
2p2 ( <P A<PB + P<PA + P<PB) 
rrM - rr~A < o if k > kA 
, where 
rrM - rr~A > o if k < kA 
M4 + J,-M___..,1,--+-4M_3_M_5 
1-kA = M > 0 2 3 
1.2M3- M4 




(1.2M3 -- M4) 2 - Ml- 4M3M5 
2~ (p + if>B) (2pcf>~ + 6p2if>A + P4>1 + l0p2if>B 
+2cp~cpB + 9pcpAcpB)(18cp~cp~ + 39p2 cp~- 35p2cpAcpB- 20p3cpB 
+36pcp~epB + 21pepAep~- 56p3epA + 9pep1 + 18p2 ep~) 
> 0 
M4 + J Ml + 4M3M5 0 6 . k O 4 __ .....:......_ ___ < . ' I. e. A > . 
21\13 
4 (p + ep A) ( ep A ep B + pep A + pep B) ( 2ep A ep B + 3 pep A + 2 pep B) 
(p + epA) (pep~ + 10p2epA + 2pep~ + 6p2epB + 2epAep~ + 9pepAepB) 
4p (p + ep A) ( ep AepB +pep A+ pepB) 
Then { 
1.2M7- M8 




(1.2M7 - Ms) 2 - Mi - 4M7M5 
4 
25 (p + 4J A) (pqy~ + 10p2qy A+ 2p</J1 + 6p24JB 
+2</J A</J1 + 9p</J A</JB)(18</J~</J1 + 18p2</J1- 35p2cj; A</JB 
+39p2 </J~- 20p3</JA + 2lp</J~</JB + 36p</JA</J1- 56p3</JB + 9p</J~) 
> 0 
A18 + JMJ + 4M7M5 . 









(4JB- 4JA) [Mg(l- k)2 - M1o(l- k)- Mn] 
Mg 2qy~cf;1 + P34JA + P3cPB + 2p2 cf;~ + 2p2cf;1 
+4pqyA4J1 + 4pqy~qyB + 5p24JAqyB- P4 
AI1o 2p4 + 2p34; A + 2p34;B + 2p24; AcPB 
Mn p4 + 3p34; A+ 3p3cf;B + 2p2 q; AcPB 
M M · -
rrj=A - rrj=B < o 1f k > k h 
M M . _ , w ere 
rri=A - rrj=B > o 1f k < k 






_1 1- = >0 
2M9 
2M9 - M 10 
4 (p + qy B) (p + qy A) ( qy A qy B + pqy A + pqy B - P2) 
> 0 
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(2M9 - M1o)2 - JVIio - 4MgMn 
4 (p + 4>B) (p + 4> A) (24> A</JB + 2p</J A+ 2p</JB - P2) 
X (2</;2 </;2 + 2p2 4>2 _ 4p3 4> + 4p4>2 4> _ 4p3 4> A B B B A B A 
+4p4> A 4>1 - 4p4 + 2p2 4>~ + p2 4> A 4>B) 
> 0 
Jtf1o + J 1\1!{0 + 4MgMn 
__ ___;__ ____ < 1 
2M9 
For this reason, IIJ!=B > IIJ!=A if the monitoring cost is sufficiently high, 
i.e. the principal would like to supervise the inefficient agent. 
9.8 Supervision vs. Revenue sharing 
ITRS 
(1- k) 2 
(1 - k)2(4>A + 4>B + 4p) 
4(4>Acf;B + 4>AP + cj;Bp) 
2(4>B- 4>A)f3if + cpA + 2p 
4(cj;Acj;B + cj;Ap + cj;Bp) 
p (cj;B + 4p) + (cj;A + 2p).j(cf;B + p) (cj;B + 4p) 
4R2 
pcj;~ + 2p2 cj; A - pcf;1 + 2p2 cj;B - cj; A cf;1 + cj;~ cj;B + pcj; A cpB 
+ (</JA</JB + cj;Ap + </JBp) J(</JB + p) (</JB + 4p) 
(
,!,.,!,. +,!,. +,!,. )p(cf;B+4p)+(cf;A+2p)J(</JB+p)(</JB+4p) 
If/ A 'f/B If/ AP If/BP ( </J A + </JB + 4p )R2 
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(<PB + 2p)2(<PA<PB +<PAP+ <PBP)2 (<PB + p) (<PB + 4p) 
-(6p2<P~- 3p2~1 + p~~ + 4p3~A- P~1 + 4p3~B 
-4JA4J1 + qy~qyB- 5pqy A4J1 + 6pqy~qyB + 3p24J A4JB) 2 
(pqy~ + 4p24J A+ 3p24JB + qy~qyB + 4pqy A4JB) (24J~4J1- <P~4JB 
+8p3qy A4JB + 20p34J1 + 26p24J A4J1- 7 p24J~4JB + 9p24J1 
-8p2 qy~ + 10p4J~<P1- 8p<P~4JB + 6p<PA4J1 + pqy~- pqy~- 12p34J~) 
> 0 
(4JA + 1B + 4p)R2 
> (4JA4JB + 4JAP + 1Bp)[p(1B + 4p) + (1A + 2p)J(1B + p) (</JB + 4p)] 
i.e.(l - k) 2 is less than 1 
(qyB + 3p) > J(</JB + p) (</JB + 4p) > (</JB + 2p) 
(1 _ k)2 > (c/JAc/JB + c/JAP + cf;Bp)(8p2 + 2pcf;A + 3pc/JB + c/JAc/JB) 
- (1A + </JB + 4p)(p1~ + 5p24JA + 5p21B + 4J~1B + 5p4JA4JB) 
25( 4J AqyB + 4J AP + 4JBp)(8p2 + 2pqy A+ 3p4JB + 4J AqyB) 
-9(4JA + qyB + 4p)(pqy~ + 5p24JA + 5p24JB + qy~qyB + 5pqyA4JB) 
164J~11- 94J~1B + 55p1A4J1- 3lp2 4J~- 9pqy~- 15pqy~qyB 
+20p3qy A+ 20p3cpB + 55p24J AqyB + 30p2c/J1 
> 0 
(1 - k)2 > 0.36, then k < 0.4 
For this reason, k < min{kA, kB}· Therefore, if the monitoring cost is 
low, the principal would like to use the fixed wage contact and supervise 
both agents. In addition, he would share the revenue if the monitoring cost 
is high. 
2(1 - k) dk = (cf;B- c/JA) [M12 + 2Ml3J(cf;B + p) (c/JB + 4p)] 
dp 2(</JA + </JB + 4p) 2 R~J(c/JB + p) (</JB + 4p) 
where 
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M12 8p3<fy~ + 32p4<fy~ + 64p5<fy~ + 2p2<P1 + 9p3<fy~ + 12p4</Y'1 + 32p5 <P1 
+4pqyA1Y1 + 96p5 qyAqyB + 15pqy~qy~ + 17pqy~qy1 + 18pqy~qy1 
+27p2 cpAcp~ + 21p2 cp~cpB + 90p3cpAc/J1 + 80p3cp~cpB + 172p4cpAc/J1 
+192p4cp~cpB + 82p2 cp~c/J1 + 66p2 c/J~c/J1 + 197p3c/J~c/J1 + 5c/J~c/J1 
+24Y~4Y1-4Y~c/J~ 
> 0 
M13 8p3qy~ + 16p4qy~ + 8p4c/J1 + 24p4 qyAc/JB + 10pc/J~4Y1 + 17p2 qy~qyB 
+28p3qyAcp1 + 38p3qy~qyB + 24p2 c/J~c/J1 + 1~11 
as 
-p2cp~- 2p3qy'1-qy~c/J~- 2pc/JAcP~- 2pqy~c/J'1- 4p2c/JAc/J'1 
M{2- 4M{3 (1YB + p) (1YB + 4p) 
(pep~+ 4p21A + 3p2c/JB + c/J~cPB + 4pc/JA1B) 2 M14 
> 0 
M14 64p4c/J~ + 9p2 c/J~ + 72p3c/J1 + 144p4c/J~ + 251;~1;~ + 4cjJAcfJ1 
+134pqy~qy1 + 712p3qyAcp~ + 208p3cp~c/JB + 342p2 c/J~c/J~ 
+249p2 qy~c/J1 + 296p3c/J~c/J1 + 80p4c/J~c/J1 + (171;~1;1- 101;~1;1) 
+(70pc/J A c/J1 - 46pqy~ c/J~) + (352p4c/J A c/J1 - 64p4c/J~ c/JB) 
+(372p2 c/JAc/J1-136p3c/J~c/J1) + (130pcp~c/J'1-108p2 c/J~c/J'1) 
> 0 
Then M12 ~+ 2M13V(cPB + p) (cPB + 4p) > 0 no matter M13 is positive or 
negative, so ~~ > 0. 
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